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NOTES
WHITE KNIGHT?: CAN THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE SAVE THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE
AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT?
Lara A. Berwanger*
INTRODUcTION
In 2000, a church that had been operating in the downtown area of
Lake Elsinore, California, for more than twelve years began to
outgrow its space.' Specifically, the church became dissatisfied with
its present location when limited parking spaces forced some of its
elderly and disabled members to park at a considerable distance from
the church.' Heads of the church began to look for another building,
and decided they wanted to move into a local Food Smarts building.3
However, the city's Planning Commission denied the church's
application to purchase the property and move to the new location.4
Among the reasons the Commission cited for turning down the
application were "loss of a needed service... , loss of tax revenue,
insufficient parking" and the belief that the denial would not be a
substantial burden on the church, as it already had a place to operate.5
Dissatisfied with the Commission's decision, the church sued the
city of Lake Elsinore to invalidate the zoning rules or compel the city
to allow the purchase of the property.6 The church based its claims on
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA"),7 a statute that requires a strict scrutiny analysis8 of laws
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
friends and family, especially my parents Patricia and Joseph, my brother Jason, and
my sister Molly, for their constant understanding, love, and support. I am grateful to
Father Charles Whelan for his guidance and assistance.
1. Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1165
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
2. Id.





7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2000).
8. For a definition of strict scrutiny, see infra note 27.
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that burden religious institutions.9 On June 24, 2003, Judge Steven
Wilson of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California decided the case and became the first judge to hold the
land use portion of RLUIPA unconstitutional, finding that the statute
exceeded Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
As the issue of RLUIPA's constitutionality reaches the courts,
counselors on both sides of the argument are mindful of a basic tenet
of constitutional law: "Every law enacted by Congress must be based
on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution."'"
In challenging the statute, opponents of RLUIPA argue that the
law violates one or more provisions of the Constitution.12 For
example, opponents have challenged RLUIPA under the
Establishment Clause, 3  the Spending Clause,14  the Tenth
9. Elsinore Christian Ctr., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
10. Id. at 1183; cf. Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87, 120-21 (D.
Conn. 2003) (finding RLUIPA constitutional); Westchester Day Sch. v. Viii. of
Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the land use portion of
RLUIPA constitutional); Freedom Baptist Church of Del. County v. Township of
Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (upholding the land use portion of
RLUIPA as constitutional).
11. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Murphy, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (challenging RLUIPA's
constitutionality under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause, and the Establishment Clause); Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 234-
39 (presenting defendants' argument that RLUIPA was unconstitutional under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the
Establishment Clause and the Tenth Amendment); Elsinore Christian Ctr., 270 F.
Supp. 2d at 1163 (noting defendants' argument that RLUIPA is unconstitutional
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
13. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. ... ). In 1971, the Supreme Court crafted a test for
determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon test, a statute is a constitutional
exercise of congressional authority if the statute (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a
principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) has no "excessive
government entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13 (quotations omitted). For case
law analyzing the land use portion of RLUIPA under the Establishment Clause, see
Westchester Day School, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (finding that RLUIPA does not
violate the Establishment Clause); Johnson v. Martin, No. 2:00-cv-075, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18368 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2002) (holding that RLUIPA does not violate the
Establishment Clause); Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 848 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (finding that RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause because it
"specifically permits safety and security... to outweigh... claim[s] to a religious
accommodation"). For a more thorough discussion of RLUIPA's analysis under an
Establishment Clause challenge, see Shawn P. Bailey, The Establishment Clause and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 16 Regent U. L.
Rev. 53 (2003).
14. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cf. 1 ("The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States .... "). For analysis of
RLUIPA under the Spending Clause, see Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman,
Getting Off of the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine and
How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 Ind. L.J. 459 (2003);
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Amendment, 5 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 To date, no case
has decided RLUIPA's constitutionality solely under the Commerce
Clause. 7 Some courts and commentators have suggested, however,
that the Commerce Clause may save RLUIPA if a court cannot find
another constitutional basis for upholding the statute. 8
This Note examines whether the Commerce Clause can provide
support for upholding RLUIPA, and argues that because RLUIPA
Diane K. Hook, Comment, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000: Congress's New Twist on "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick," 34 Urb. Law.
829 (2002).
15. The Tenth Amendment provides that "Itihe powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X; see Westchester Day
Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (finding that RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth
Amendment). For more discussion on the separation of powers and the Tenth
Amendment pertaining to RLUIPA, see Ada-Marie Walsh, Note, Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 Wm.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 189, 211-14 (2001).
16. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
that: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. For a more thorough analysis
of RLUIPA under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Murphy, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 117-
21 (finding RLUIPA a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 234-37
(concluding that RLUIPA does not violate Congress's power under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Elsinore Christian Ctr., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-82
(finding that the land use portion of RLUIPA exceeds Congress's authority under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). For a more thorough discussion of
whether RLUIPA is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Shawn Jensvold, The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of Congressional
Power?, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 1 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court will probably
find RLUIPA constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment); Frank T. Santoro,
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 493 (2002); Caroline R. Adams,
Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA's Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court's Strict
Scrutiny?, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2361 (2002); Kris Banvard, Note, Exercise in
Frustration? A New Attempt by Congress to Restore Strict Scrutiny to Governmental
Burdens on Religious Practice, 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 279, 324-27 (2003); Joshua R.
Geller, Note, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: An
Unconstitutional Exercise of Congress's Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 6 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 561 (2003) (arguing that RLUIPA is
unconstitutional under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 230. The defendants
challenged RLUIPA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause and on three
other constitutional bases. Id. at 234-39.
18. See, e.g., Elsinore Christian Ctr., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 ("[RLUIPA] and its
legislative history imply an alternative source of congressional authority: the
Commerce Clause.").
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regulates non-economic, local activity, lacks congressional findings,
contains an unsatisfactory jurisdictional element, and violates notions
of federalism, the Commerce Clause cannot support a finding that
RLUIPA is constitutional. This Note focuses on the land use portion
of RLUIPA. Part I of this Note explores the line of congressional
legislation leading up to the passage of RLUIPA in 2000 and the
legislative history of the Act itself. Part I also analyzes the history of
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence and recent
federal appellate court decisions regarding the Commerce Clause.
Part II of this Note outlines the arguments for finding RLUIPA
constitutional, and the arguments for finding it unconstitutional.
Finally, since there have been no appellate cases regarding the validity
of RLUIPA under a Commerce Clause analysis, 9 Part III discusses
other appellate court Commerce Clause decisions, and uses arguments
from Part II to conclude that RLUIPA is not a valid exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause power.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: BACKGROUND OF RLUIPA AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
From 1963 to 1990, courts employed a strict scrutiny standard to
review any law that substantially burdened religious practices.2' The
Supreme Court struck down that standard of review as applied to
religion in Employment Division v. Smith.21 Instead, the standard the
Court developed in Smith requires that strict scrutiny will apply only
when a law intentionally discriminates against religious practices.22
Since that landmark decision, Congress has attempted to pass
legislation23 restoring the strict scrutiny standard24 for laws that
19. To date, no circuit court has taken a position on the issue of whether the land
use portion of RLUIPA is constitutional. The circuit courts have instead only heard
cases involving the institutionalized persons portion of RLUIPA. See Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause because RLUIPA favors religious rights without showing any
proof that religious rights are more oppressed than other fundamental rights); Charles
v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that RLUIPA is a legitimate
exercise of congressional Spending Clause authority); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314
F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that RLUIPA is a constitutional exercise of
Congress's Spending Clause authority). For an analysis of the constitutionality of the
institutionalized persons portion of RLUIPA, see Heather Guidry, Comment, If at
First You Don't Succeed...: Can the Commerce and Spending Clauses Support
Congress's Latest Attempt at Religious Freedom Legislation?, 32 Cumb. L. Rev. 419
(2002).
20. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (examining compulsory
education law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (reviewing unemployment
benefits).
21. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
22. See id.
23. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2000) ("RFRA"); the Religious Liberty Protection Act, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong.
(1999) ("RLPA"). For a discussion of RFRA, see infra notes 27-38 and
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substantially burden religious practices even though the law was not
enacted in order to create the burden. RLUIPA is the latest statute in
that legislative effort.
In the same period that Congress and the Supreme Court shaped
the role of strict scrutiny in religion cases, the Court analyzed and
altered its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 25  Because each line of
cases is relevant to analyzing RLUIPA, Part I of this Note first
examines the Supreme Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence prior to
1990. Then, Part I discusses the flurry of congressional legislation
after 1990, including RLUIPA, which attempted to restore a strict
scrutiny analysis. Next, this part explores RLUIPA's legislative
history and implications. Finally, Part I analyzes the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence before and after 2000, the year of
RLUIPA's enactment.
A. The Legislative Path to RL UIPA
In 1993, the House of Representatives attempted to pass legislation
to restore a strict scrutiny standard to governmental acts burdening
religious groups. 26 However, until RLUIPA, such legislation failed in
the Senate, or, if enacted, the Supreme Court determined that it was
unconstitutional. This section discusses the statutes the House of
Representatives drafted between 1990 and 2000, culminating in
RLUIPA.
1. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
From 1963 to 1990, the Supreme Court subjected any legislation
that substantially burdens religious practices to a strict scrutiny
accompanying text. For a discussion of RLPA, see infra notes 39-52 and
accompanying text.
24. For a definition of strict scrutiny, see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). For a more in-depth analysis of Morrison and Lopez, see
Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of
Federalism, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 109 (2000); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips,
Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United
States v. Morrison, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 605 (2001). For a discussion of Lopez, see Lisa
Yumi Gillette, Note, Lawyers, Guns, and Commerce: United States v. Lopez and the
New Commerce Clause Doctrine, 46 DePaul L. Rev. 823 (1997); Eric Andrew Pullen,
Note, Guns, Domestic Violence, Interstate Commerce, and the Lautenberg
Amendment: "[S]imply Because Congress May Conclude That a Particular Activity
Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce Does Not Necessarily Make It So.," 39 S.
Tex. L. Rev. 1029 (1998). For further information on Morrison, see Jennifer L.
Wethington, Note, Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-Violence Against Women
Act's Civil Rights Remedy Exceeds Congress's Powers to Regulate Interstate
Commerce, 23 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 485 (2001).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
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standard, 27 which requires that the acting government body2 show
that the legislation was necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest 29 and that the legislation was the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest. 30
27. The version of strict scrutiny that courts used in most free exercise cases
between 1963 and 1990 derives from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The
Sherbert test covers governmental regulations that impose a substantial burden on a
religious group's belief or activity. Id. at 404. To establish that the regulation is
constitutional, the acting governmental body must show that the regulation advances
a compelling governmental interest and does so by the least restrictive means
possible. Id. at 403. The Court again applied strict scrutiny in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the right of the Amish to freely exercise their religious
beliefs by not sending their children to high schools that complied with Wisconsin's
compulsory high school curriculum requirement outweighed Wisconsin's interest in
mandatory attendance at such high schools).
According to one commentator, the standard is "'strict' in theory and usually
'fatal' in fact." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-6, at 1451 (2d
ed. 1988) (citations omitted). The common explanation for the application of a strict
scrutiny standard is to avoid deference to Congressional decisions. Id. at 1001. If
Congress determines that there is a necessity for a law, courts generally want to defer
to that decision, because the Supreme Court considers reviewing the constitutionality
of a congressional act to be a grave and delicate duty. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S.
142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). The seeds of strict scrutiny analysis
appear as far back as United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Writing for the majority, Justice Stone predicted:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments.... [L]egislation which restricts those political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.... (W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). For a deeper analysis of the implications of Carolene
Products, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713,
740-46 (1985), reprinted in A Constitutional Law Anthology 42 (Michael J. Glennon
ed., 1992). For a more thorough discussion of strict scrutiny analysis, see Banvard,
supra note 16.
28. The acting governmental body could be Congress or one of the state
legislatures.
29. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 221-22. The Court found no compelling state
interest and therefore did not reach the issue of whether the legislation was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. Id. at 234.
30. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. For decisions from the period before 1963,
see Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Supreme Court later overruled the judgment in
Gobitis, but not the Gobitis Court's explanation of the Free Exercise Clause. See W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Courts should use a strict scrutiny analysis to review any legislative program
that burdens citizens in a manner that violates individuals' fundamental rights. Tribe,
supra note 27, § 16-7, at 1454. The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to
analyze denial of welfare benefits, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding
unconstitutional provisions in state and federal welfare laws that did not give welfare
2004] THE COMMERCE CLAUSE & THE RLUIPA
In 1990, in a decision that surprised many in its refusal to require
exceptions for the exercise of religion, the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Employment Division v. Smith.3 Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia held that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest."32 The Court's
decision effectively removed the application of a strict scrutiny
standard to generally applicable laws.33
Congress responded to the Smith decision by passing the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act ("RFRA").3 4 Congress intended to
restore a strict scrutiny standard to generally applicable laws that
negatively affected religious practices.35 In enacting the law, Congress
relied on its enforcement power in the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply the law to the states.36 But the Supreme Court struck down the
application of RFRA to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores,"
holding that Congress had acted outside the scope of its enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.38 Congress would have to
go back to the drawing board.
to persons who had not resided in the administering jurisdictions for one year); to
analyze laws placing restrictions on individuals' right to vote, Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (finding unconstitutional a state law mandating a
poll tax); and to invalidate a state law mandating the sterilization of persons convicted
of two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 536 (1942). The Court has also applied strict scrutiny to uphold a woman's right
to choose abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But see Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
31. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
32. Id. at 886 n.3.
33. Justice Scalia gave the following examples of "generally applicable laws":
compulsory military service, the payment of taxes, health and safety regulation such
as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and
traffic laws. Id. at 888-89 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia then concluded that the
protection of religious liberty that the First Amendment provides does not necessitate
such a wide application, and rejected the compelling state interest test. Id. The Court,
however, did not overrule Sherbert or Yoder. Id. at 882 n.1, 884-85. The Court
distinguished Sherbert as involving a built-in mechanism for evaluating individual
claims for unemployment benefits. Id. at 884-85. The Court distinguished Yoder by
pointing out that more than a mere free exercise claim was involved. Parental rights
in education were also at stake. Id. at 882 n.1.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2000).
35. Id. § 2000bb(a)(3).
36. For the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a discussion of
congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra
note 16.
37. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Boerne Court found that "RFRA is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood
as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears,
instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections." Id. at 532.
The Court then went on to strike down the law as unconstitutional because "RFRA
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal
balance." Id. at 536.
38. Id. at 516-36.
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2. The Religious Liberty Protection Act
The holding in Boerne gave Congress guidance on how to draft a
law that could survive a constitutional challenge but still protect
religious liberty. Thus, the House of Representatives again attempted
to invoke a strict scrutiny standard in the Religious Liberty Protection
Act of 1999 ("RLPA"). 9 The Supreme Court in Boerne had led
Congress to believe that it needed to cite additional constitutional
support for its authority to enact such a law.n° Available constitutional
bases of authority for Congress included the Spending Clause,4 the
Tenth Amendment,42 the Commerce Clause,4 3 the Establishment
Clause,' and the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Therefore, one of the
major differences between RLPA and its predecessor, RFRA, was the
House of Representatives' articulation of additional constitutional
authority in the bill.46
On June 15, 2000, the House of Representatives voted to endorse
the Religious Liberty Protection Act and sent the bill to the Senate
for further approval.47 The Senate, however, rejected the bill because
of concern regarding its broad nature.' Some members of the Senate
39. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
40. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 536. Because the Boerne Court found that
Congress had violated the separation of powers in enacting the law, Congress added
additional bases for authority in enacting future religious statutes in case the statutes
violated the separation of powers. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
41. The Spending Clause provides Congress with "Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cf. 1.
42. The Tenth Amendment prescribes that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
43. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ..
U.S. Const. amend. I.
45. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 8 n.12 (1999). Although
the Boerne Court struck down RFRA on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, Congress
believed RLPA would withstand a Fourteenth Amendment challenge because it
focused on land use regulation and Congress found evidence of discrimination against
religious groups in that area. H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 17.
46. Id. at 12-18. Another difference was that RLPA required congruence and
proportionality of the state's action to the compelling interest. Id. at 13.
47. See generally Walsh, supra note 15. The House of Representatives passed
RLPA by a 306-118 vote. Kenny Byrd, Religious Liberty Protection Act [P/asses U.S.
House of Representatives, Associated Baptist Press (July 15, 1999), at
http://www.abpnews.com/abpnews/story.cfm?newsld=2961.
48. 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7778-79 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Reid).
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expressed concern that the bill might violate civil rights,49 especially in
the area of employment."
In light of Congress's failed efforts to alter the legal landscape,
Boerne and Smith allowed the government to burden religious
conduct with generally applicable laws without triggering a strict
scrutiny analysis requiring a compelling government interest.5 After
the failure of RLPA, Smith stood as the prevailing law at the turn of
the century. Dissatisfied with the legal atmosphere, Congress again
tried to overturn Smith when it enacted RLIUPA."
3. Congress's Latest Tool: The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
After the Senate's unfavorable reaction to RLPA, the House of
Representatives was less ambitious in expanding religious protection
beyond the rule the Court established in Smith. 3 Congress limited the
focus of RLUIPA to two areas: restrictions on land use and on
prisoners.54 RLUIPA sharply restricts the application of land use laws
that affect religious exercise:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.55
Despite its narrow scope, RLUIPA marked another congressional
attempt to apply strict scrutiny analysis to legislation substantially
burdening religious groups' land use. Congress drafted RLUIPA on
the belief that strict scrutiny analysis was the only way to protect
religious liberty.56 Congress narrowed the scope of the bill to cover
49. Id. ("[T]he legislation stalled in the Senate when legitimate concerns were
raised that RLPA, as drafted, would supersede certain civil rights .... ).
50. "For example, one could foresee conflict between a state's interest in
eliminating sexual discrimination and the freedom of religious institutions to adhere
to practices of limiting eligibility for ordination into the clergy based on sex." Evan M.
Shapiro, Note, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: An
Analysis Under the Commerce Clause, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1255, 1265 (2001) (analyzing
RLUIPA under the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as the issue of
RLUIPA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause had not yet reached the
courts).
51. Id. at 1264.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2000).
53. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 106-4862 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
662.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. This Note discusses only the land use portion of RLUIPA.
55. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
56. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7778 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Reid). But see Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land
2363
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only land use and institutionalized persons because Congress found
the most evidence of religious burdens in those areas.57 Although
RLUIPA narrows the scope of religious protection to those two areas,
the act broadly defines religious exercise. RLUIPA protects "any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief,""s thereby creating a large hurdle for local
governments. 9
RLUIPA's implications are far-reaching. Religious groups have
used RLUIPA to challenge local zoning board decisions prohibiting
them from expanding their houses of worship.60 RLUIPA may also
apply to "Megachurches."61  One woman and the religious sect to
which she belonged, the Fellowship of the Sacred Spirit,62 sued the
local government under RLUIPA. The woman had been holding
prayer and song meetings, followed by supper, in her home on
Saturday evenings.63 Eventually these meetings snowballed into
services, and neighbors called the local zoning officials to complain
when she erected a blue wooden arc on her front lawn and allowed
visitors who could not find places to park on the street to park on the
lawn.' A zoning official visited the woman, and informed her that she
was violating local ordinances by operating a church and allowing the
Uses After Boerne, 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 861, 867 (2000). Tuttle argues that because
many courts consider strict scrutiny to be too harsh a standard for the burdens in
religious land use cases, the courts often fail to apply the standard "with vigor." Id.
Therefore, Tuttle proposes that religious institutions may find a less stringent judicial
test more satisfying. Id.; cf. Von G. Keetch & Matthew K. Richards, The Need for
Legislation to Enshrine Free Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
725, 725-26 (1999).
57. 146 Cong. Rec. S7774.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
59. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 198. After listing RLUIPA's numerous possible
applications, Walsh notes that local governments, faced with a RLUIPA challenge
"will have an uphill battle to show they are compelling governmental interests." Id.
60. James McCurtis Jr., Church Files Suit Against Meridian Over School, Lansing
State J., Dec. 9, 2003, at lB. The article reports that the Okemos Christian Center in
Meridian Township, Michigan sued the township for violating RLUIPA. Id. The
township refused to allow the center to add a 35,000 square foot extension. Id.
61. Jonathan D. Weiss & Randy Lowell, Supersizing Religion: Megachurches,
Sprawl, and Smart Growth, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 313, 314 (2002).
"Megachurches" are religious institutions with more than 2,000 members that provide
a slew of other services in addition to the traditional weekly service. Id. Some
examples of other services "Megachurches" provide are McDonald's restaurants,
programs for singles, health clubs, and rock concerts. David B. Zucco, Note, Super-
Sized with Fries: Regulating Religious Land Use in the Era of Megachurches, 88 Minn.
L. Rev. 416, 439-40 (2003).
62. The Fellowship of the Sacred Spirit is a religious sect that links its members
through a website. The members meet locally in their homes for prayer meetings.
Michael S. Giaimo & Dwight Merriam, Church v. State: Just Pray You're Not Sued
Under the RLUIPA Statute, 69 Am. Plan. Ass'n 14, 14 (2003)
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id.
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members to park on the lawn." The woman agreed to encourage her
fellow members to car pool, but refused to stop the weekly meetings.66
The zoning official issued a cease and desist order.67 Two days later,
he was served a federal writ pursuant to RLUIPA that enjoined the
city and the zoning board from enforcing the ordinance against the
woman and her group.68
The outcome of that suit may be in line with similar cases. In a
recent appellate case in Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit held that a city
could be liable for violating private land owners' rights under
RLUIPA.69 Moreover, churches and temples located in historic
buildings can use RLUIPA to ignore local zoning laws regarding
historic landmarks.7" RLUIPA allows religious groups to disobey
local laws with which other landowners must comply7" and allows
federal courts to overturn zoning decisions that local governments
make for their towns.72  RLUIPA also applies to "religious
educational facilities, home religious study, religiously affiliated
homeless shelters, and social services. ' 73 RLUIPA may even allow
religious groups to ignore fire or health codes that substantially
burden religious practices and cannot be proven necessary to
accomplish compelling governmental objectives. 4
Congress had both Smith and Boerne in mind when drafting
RLUIPA. Language in RLUIPA deliberately contradicts Smith. The
Act mandates strict scrutiny "even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability."75  Congress used language echoing Justice
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id. If the group is successful in the ensuing litigation, not only will its
members be able to continue meeting in a residential area, but the court may order
the city to pay the group's legal fees as well. Id. Trial fees could range from $50,000 to
$100,000 or higher. Id. Even for a large city, that is a high price to pay. Id.
69. The city violated RLUIPA by denying a beach access permit to a property
owner who conducted weddings at her home and wanted beach access for the
ceremonies. Id.
70. See John R. Throop, Facts (and Faith) Help Avoid Conflict, 69 Am. Plan.
Ass'n 16, 16 (2003). Throop establishes that churches and preservationists often clash
over whether the church may alter a historic building. Id. Because RLUIPA's scope
is far-reaching, it would seem that the statute may give religious groups support for
their argument that they do not have to obey any historic landmark restrictions.
Giaimo & Merriam, supra note 62, at 16 ("RLUIPA's scope is broad. Nearly every
denial of a permit or enforcement of a land-use regulation against a religious entity
can give rise to a claim under the act.").
71. See Giaimo & Merriam, supra note 62, at 16.
72. See John M. Armentano, Religious Wars: RLUIPA and Security Standard at
Heart of Ruling, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 2003, at 5.
73. Walsh, supra note 15, at 190.
74. Id. Although no court has addressed this issue, Walsh believes that health and
fire codes possibly fall under RLUIPA's vast scope. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
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Scalia's in order to attempt to effectively overrule Smith.76 Influenced
by the message in Boerne that Congress should base its power to
legislate on multiple constitutional clauses, Congress derived its power
to enact RLUIPA from the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. 7 RLUIPA attempts to apply strict scrutiny analysis "in
any case in which ... the substantial burden affects, or removal of that
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes. '' 78 At issue in this
Note is whether this recital of authority is enough to survive a
Commerce Clause challenge. Thus, the following section traces the
history and application of this critical constitutional provision.
B. The History of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence appeared
well settled until 1995."9 The Court drastically altered its approach to
Commerce Clause claims in 199580 and continued to do so through
2000.81 Today, in the wake of this transformation, the Court's
approach to the Commerce Clause is anything but clear, thereby
requiring a careful exploration of past and recent trends.
Accordingly, this section outlines the history of the Commerce Clause
in order to provide a basis for analyzing RLUIPA under the
Commerce Clause in Parts II and III of this Note.
1. Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause Pre-Lopez
Starting in the early 1940s and continuing until 1995, the Supreme
Court applied a very lenient test when reviewing legislation under the
Commerce Clause. Specifically, the Court asked whether: (1) there
was "a rational basis to support Congress'[s] finding that the regulated
activity affects interstate commerce" and (2) the "means chosen by
Congress [were] reasonably adapted to the end sought to be
achieved.""2 In the last decade, however, the Supreme Court, in two
76. Id. RLUIPA mandates that strict scrutiny will apply "even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability." Id. (emphasis added). The Court in
Employment Division v. Smith held that strict scrutiny would not apply to a burden
resulting from a rule of general applicability. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990); see also Ruth
Colker, City of Boerne Revisited, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 455, 464-65 (2002) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994)) ("Many members of Congress who supported this
legislation apparently thought that Congress could 'overturn' a constitutional law
decision by the Court by 'restoring' an earlier decision of the Court.").
77. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b).
79. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
81. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). There have been no
Supreme Court cases analyzing the Commerce Clause since 2000.
82. See Jil L. Martin, Note, United States v. Morrison: Federalism Against the Will
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landmark opinions,83 has limited the scope of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, and will no longer allow Congress
essentially unchecked authority under that clause.
2. United States v. Lopez
The Supreme Court drastically reined in Congress's Commerce
Clause power in United States v. Lopez.84 On March 10, 1992, Alfonso
Lopez, a twelfth-grade student, brought a concealed .38 caliber
handgun and five bullets with him to school.85 Authorities at the
school received a tip that Lopez had a weapon, and confronted him.86
Lopez admitted to carrying a weapon, and police authorities arrested
him the next day, charging him with violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA").87 A federal grand jury indicted
Lopez, at which point he challenged the constitutionality of § 922(q)
of the States, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 243, 272 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
Martin provides a composite history of judicial interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. For further discussion of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see Bradley A. Harsch, Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce Clause
Canard: A Synthesis of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 321 (1999);
Gillette, supra note 25.
83. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
84. 514 U.S. 549; cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 286-93
(1981) (holding that the rational basis test from Heart of Atlanta justifies
congressional regulation of an activity which creates environmental defects);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding the Fair Labor Standards Act
constitutional under the Commerce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that Congress must have a rational basis for finding a
substantial effect on interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299
(1964) (holding that Congress needs only a rational basis for finding a substantial
effect on interstate commerce for the Court to find the regulation constitutional
under the Commerce Clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)
(overturning use of distinction between indirect and direct effects on commerce);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that the Commerce Clause
grants Congress the power to place restrictions on the production of goods); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that activities that "have
such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions" are
under Congress's Commerce Clause authority); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (finding that goods that may or may not be bound for interstate commerce
qualify as commerce); Houston & Tex. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(finding that the Commerce clause authorizes congressional regulation of intrastate
commerce if the regulation is an incidental effect of interstate commerce regulation);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (distinguishing between
manufacturing and commerce, as well as between direct and indirect effects on
commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding invalid a New
York statute that conflicted with a valid federal statute regulating the operation of
steamboats in New York harbor).
85. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. 1988)).
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of GFSZA under the Commerce Clause.88 The District Court rejected
his argument and found Lopez guilty under the statute.89 On appeal,
Lopez argued that GFSZA "exceeded Congress'[s] power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause."9  The Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of the importance of the issue.9"
In its opinion, the Court began by noting that Gibbons v. Ogden
92
had recognized that the very language of the Commerce Clause
explicitly limits the commerce power.93 The Court went on to describe
the subsequent century of Commerce Clause cases before laying down
the test it would adopt as its new standard. To survive a Commerce
Clause challenge after Lopez, the law in question must regulate an
economic activity that either (1) uses the "channels of interstate
commerce," (2) uses "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or
persons or things in interstate commerce," or (3) has a "substantial
relation to interstate commerce." 94
88. Id. Section 922(q)(1)(A) of GFSZA made it a federal offense "for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)).
89. Id. at 552.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Lopez, 511 U.S. 1029 (1994). The Court failed to elaborate
on the reasons it viewed the issue as important.
92. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, New York had attempted to enjoin a
federally licensed competitor steamboat operator from operating a New York-to-New
Jersey route for which New York had previously held a monopoly. Id. at 2. The New
York law restricting the use of the waterway by other steamboat operators conflicted
with a federal statute, and New York unsuccessfully argued that the federal statute
violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 186, 197.
93. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 at 194-95). The
Court found:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a
State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not
extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is
certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.... The
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if
we regard the language, or the subject of the sentence, must be the
exclusively internal commerce of a State.
Id.
94. Id. at 558-59. Both proponents and opponents of RLUIPA concede that the
law does not fall within the first two categories set forth in Lopez. See, e.g., Reply
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 2, Elsinore Christian Ctr.
v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 01-4842),
available at http://www.rluipa.org/cases/Elsinore-TBF-CommerceClauseBrief.pdf.
The Becket Fund, a religious advocacy group located in Washington, D.C., submitted
the brief. The Fund often files amici curiae briefs in religious litigation. The Fund
also hosts a website with a wealth of information on RLUIPA updated daily at
www.rluipa.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). The Fund is one of the most active
supporters of RLUIPA, and focuses its Commerce Clause arguments on the third
Lopez category. Therefore, this Note focuses on whether zoning regulations fall
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After describing the range of activities appropriate for federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause, the Lopez Court articulated a
pattern or common thread in the Supreme Court's previous
Commerce Clause jurisprudence: "Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce," the Court will sustain
"legislation regulating that activity."95 The Court then went on to
strike down GFSZA as unconstitutional for two key reasons. First,
the Court held that the statute was criminal by its terms and had
nothing to do with either commerce or "economic enterprise."96
Second, the statute contained no jurisdictional element97 which would
"ensure[] through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce."98  Clearly, the lack of a
jurisdictional element was of serious concern to the Lopez Court.
Also of concern to the Court was the lack of congressional findings
showing a link between violence in school zones and interstate
commerce.99 When the Court must interpret a statute, and no
substantial effect on interstate commerce is apparent to the "naked
eye,"100 the Court looks to congressional findings for any link between
the regulated conduct and interstate commerce.' Although the
under the third category-economic activities "having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. The Court described its previous Commerce Clause
cases where it had upheld statutes under the Commerce Clause, such as the regulation
of intrastate coal mining, Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981); intrastate extortionate credit transactions, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971); restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964); inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, Heart of Atlanta
Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); and production and consumption of
homegrown wheat, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-
60.
96. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
97. A jurisdictional element is a part of a statute containing language that requires
the government to demonstrate in each proceeding an additional nexus with interstate
commerce for an activity to fall within the statute's regulatory scope. Id. at 561-62. In
other words, a jurisdictional element is a "provision in a federal statute that requires
the government to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction
in connection with any individual application of the statute." United States v. Rodia,
194 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 1999). Congress uses a jurisdictional element to limit the
scope of a statute to a particular set of facts that substantially affect interstate
commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
98. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. The Court also remarked that it was reluctant to
interpret a congressional statute to determine its constitutionality. Id. at 562 (quoting
United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448 (1953) (plurality opinion)
("The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will
construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional
questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative.")).
99. Id. at 562-63.
100. Id. at 563.
101. Id. at 562-63.
Although as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under
the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed
even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate
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Court does not require Congress to make formal findings, such
findings would aid the Court in such a case.) ° As the Court found
that the government had proffered no findings in this case, 1°3 the
Court held that the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 was beyond
the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power."°  The Court
revisited the issue of the Commerce Clause in United States v.
Morrison. 5 Part I.B.3. below considers how the Court fine tuned its
definition of the Commerce Clause in that case.
3. United States v. Morrison
The Court further limited Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause in Morrison.'016 Antonio Morrison was a student at Virginia
Tech University and a member of the football team."0 7 In the fall of
1994, a female Virginia Tech student, Christy Brzonkala, accused
Morrison and another member of the football team, James Crawford,
of assaulting and raping her.0 8 In early 1995, Brzonkala filed a
complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's
sexual assault policy, but ultimately the school dropped the charges
against Crawford."°
Virginia Tech's judicial committee found Morrison guilty only of
"using abusive language."' 10  Morrison appealed the conviction
through the University's administrative channels, and the University's
Senior Vice President set aside the conviction."' Virginia Tech did
not inform Brzonkala that the Senior Vice President had reversed
Morrison's conviction, and when Brzonkala read in a newspaper that
Morrison would be returning in the fall of 1995, she withdrew from
school. "'2
The following December, Brzonkala filed suit against Crawford,
Virginia Tech, and Morrison in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia. "3 Brzonkala's complaint against
commerce ... [w]e agree with the [g]overnment that Congress normally is
not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an
activity has on interstate commerce.
Id. at 562.
102. Id. at 563 ("Congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye.").
103. Id. at 562.
104. Id. at 568.
105. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 602.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 603.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 603-04.
113. Id. at 604.
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Morrison and Crawford alleged that they had violated § 13981 of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA")."4 The district
court dismissed Brzonkala's claims against Morrison and Crawford,
holding that Congress lacked authority under both the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to enact such a law." 5 The
Fourth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed the district court's ruling
on the constitutionality of VAWA. 16 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari'1 7 on whether VAWA fell within Congress's constitutional
powers. "8
The Morrison Court began its Commerce Clause analysis of
VAWA by noting the tension between two prevailing concepts in
Lopez: that the Court is bound to show a strong deference to
Congress's decisions, and that the Commerce Clause places real
boundaries on the extent to which Congress may legislate." 9  The
Court then explored whether VAWA fit into the third category of
congressional power in Lopez, namely, the power over economic
activity having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 10 The
Court ultimately struck down VAWA on Commerce Clause grounds
for two key reasons. First, the Court concluded that "[g]ender
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity."'' Second, the statute contained no jurisdictional
element ordering that the federal cause of action arise only when
Congress has the power to regulate, namely in situations involving
interstate commerce.
122
114. Section 13981 states that "persons within the United States shall have the right
to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2000).
115. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604 (citing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ.,
935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996)).
116. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 829 (4th Cir. 1999).
117. United States v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999) (granting certiorari).
118. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605.
119. Id. at 607.
120. Id. at 609. Because neither the petitioner nor respondent argued that VAWA
fit within the first two categories of congressional power, the Court focused on
whether the activity that VAWA regulated fell within Congress's power "to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,... i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 37 (1937))).
121. Id. at 613.
122. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1). Section
2261(a)(1) is another provision of VAWA that provides an individual remedy within
federal jurisdiction for gender-motivated crime:
A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian country
with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or
intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel,
intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to
such spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided by subsection
(b).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1)).
The Morrison Court noted that every federal court of appeals to hear the issue
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The Morrison Court also noted that in drafting the statute,
Congress had amassed numerous findings showing the impact of
gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce. 123 However, the
Court did not allow such findings to change its determination that
Congress was acting beyond the scope of its Commerce Clause power.
The Court stressed that whether particular activities substantially
affect interstate commerce remains ultimately within the discretion of
the judicial rather than the legislative branch.124 Specifically, the
congressional findings did not sway the Court because the findings
showed only an attenuated link, rather than a direct link, between
gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce.125
Morrison is the most recent Supreme Court case analyzing
Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause.
Therefore, as lower courts determine the constitutionality of
RLUIPA, they must adhere to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Morrison and Lopez. 26 Part II of this Note examines whether
RLUIPA falls within the Supreme Court's definition of the
Commerce Clause as set forth in Morrison and Lopez.
II. A DEBATE Is BORN: IS RLUIPA A CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE
OF CONGRESS'S COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER?
As of March 21, 2004, no federal appellate court has decided
whether the land use portion of RLUIPA is a constitutional exercise
of congressional authority, under any constitutional doctrine. Most
early lower federal court cases focused on provisions other than the
Commerce Clause to analyze the constitutionality of the land use
portion of RLUIPA. However, courts recently have begun to look to
the Commerce Clause to validate RLUIPA when other constitutional
provisions fail to support the statute's constitutionality. 127 Part II of
this Note discusses the arguments for and against finding RLUIPA a
constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.
of the constitutionality of this section of VAWA had upheld it even though it is an
example of Congress regulating an activity that is criminal in nature because the
provision regulates the "use of channels of interstate commerce" and therefore
"properly falls within the first of Lopez's categories." Id. at 614 n.5. However, the
section of VAWA at issue in Morrison differed in that it did not properly fall within
any of Lopez's categories. Id. (citing United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72
(5th Cir. 1999)).
123. Id. at 614.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 615-16.
126. See infra Part II.
127. See, e.g., Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163,
1182-83 (C.D. Cal. 2003). After holding that RLUIPA is unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Judge Steven Wilson found that RLUIPA may be
constitutional under Congress's Commerce Clause power and ordered the parties to
submit briefs in support of their arguments under the Commerce Clause. Id.
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A. Getting to Yes or the Majority View: RLUIPA Is Constitutional
Under the Commerce Clause
The argument that RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power revolves around the premise that "[d]ue
respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government
demands that [the Supreme Court] invalidate a congressional
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds." '128 This principle acts as a presumption that
Congress has legislated within its constitutional powers.'1 9  This
section analyzes the argument that RLUIPA is a constitutional
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power because RLUIPA
regulates economic activity, contains a jurisdictional element
requiring an additional nexus to interstate commerce, contains
sufficient, though limited congressional findings, and has a direct link
to interstate commerce.
1. RLUIPA Regulates an Economic Activity
The District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld
RLUIPA under a Commerce Clause challenge in Westchester Day
School v. Village of Mamaroneck.3 ° Under the district court's view,
RLUIPA regulates commerce and the economic enterprise of buying
and selling land, as well as operating a school on that land.'31 The
district court found that "a plaintiff's activities in operating an
orthodox Jewish day school is an economic endeavor within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause." '132 Furthermore, the Westchester
Day School court stated that the argument that churches are non-
profit entities and, therefore, are not economic enterprises has no
merit because the scope of the Commerce Clause includes such
charitable and not-for-profit entities.'33 Such entities fall within the
Commerce Clause's scope because they engage substantially in
interstate markets such as those for goods and services, as well as the
use of interstate transportation and communications, in their acts of
raising and distributing profits and revenues."34 The District Court for
128. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568,
577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). This interpretive principle is perhaps
rooted in the Court's belief that "[j]udging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress
is properly considered 'the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called
upon to perform."' Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319
(1985) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (citation omitted)).
129. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
130. 280 F. Supp. 2d 230,238 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
131. Id.
132. Id. The court operated under the assumption that "[i]n the Commerce Clause
dimension, Congress's power over economic activity remains extraordinarily broad."
Id.
133. Id. at 237.
134. Id. (citing United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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the Central District of Pennsylvania also upheld RLUIPA against a
Commerce Clause challenge in Freedom Baptist Church v. Township
of Middletown, finding that the Act regulated economic activity.135
Similarly, although with a different result, the Supreme Court
weighed the economic factor heavily in both Morrison and Lopez.
The Court affirmed the importance of the regulated act being
economic in nature in Morrison, noting that in cases in which the
Court upheld congressional regulation of an activity "based upon the
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce," the act
regulated some type of "economic endeavor."' 36 The Supreme Court
struck down both GSFZA and VAWA primarily because the Court
found that the statutes did not regulate economic activity.'37 Thus,
economic impact has been the most important factor in the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence and can save a statute from a
constitutional challenge.
Proponents of RLUIPA and courts that have upheld its
constitutionality argue that RLUIPA meets the test of regulating
economic activity. The Becket Fund,'38 one of the strongest
proponents of RLUIPA, urges that "RLUIPA, by its very terms,
regulates 'economic activity': burdens on the use and development of
real property, where the burdens also affect interstate commerce."139
In other words, RLUIPA may protect a religious group's purchase or
135. Freedom Baptist Church v. Township of Middleton, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 874
(E.D. Pa. 2002). Freedom Baptist Church is a non-denominational religious group of
approximately twenty-five members. Id. at 859. The Church attempted to enter into a
lease to use half of a building in Middletown Township. Id. The Zoning Board
informed the owners of the building that the town's zoning ordinances forbade the
Church to use the property. Id. The Zoning Board held a hearing on the issue and
allegedly denied the Church's application for the lease. Id. The Church brought an
action against the township under RLUIPA. Id. At a Bible study meeting after the
district court decision, the Church's pastor, Rev. Chris Keay, led the congregation in
prayer. Adam Liptak, No-Church Zoning District Faces a Challenge, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 2002, at A10. The pastor asked the other congregants to join him in praying
for the "salvation, spiritual growth and health of the 17 people he listed by name," as
well as for the "Appeal Court Decision on RLUIPA." Id.
136. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995)).
137. See id. at 615-17 (finding that despite congressional findings, gender-motivated
violence was simply not economic in nature and, therefore, striking down VAWA as
unconstitutional); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (finding that GFSZA was a criminal statute
that had no association with economic activity). For further discussion of the
economic nature of gender-motivated violence, see infra note 193.
138. See supra note 94.
139. Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 5, Elsinore
Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 01-
4842) (citing Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 867-68), available at
http://www.rluipa.orglcases/Elsinore-TBF-CommerceClauseBrief.pdf. Moreover, the
Becket Fund argues that since RLUIPA has a jurisdictional element, a court does not
need to determine whether the regulated activity in question is also generally
economic. Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
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development of real property, and so proponents argue that a court
must consider the law as regulating an economic activity.
A recent Fifth Circuit case exemplifies the argument that zoning
laws fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power.141 In Groome
Resources Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the
constitutionality of the Fair Housing Amendments Act.14' The court
reviewed the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
finding a broad definition of economic activity. 42 In urging a similar
view of RLUIPA, the Becket Fund also relied on a broad definition of
economic activity that would include a construction project and
renovation.
143
Further support for the argument that zoning regulations are
economic in nature comes from commentators who argue that halting
extensive construction projects has implications affecting all the
activities necessary to complete the project, such as the employment
of construction workers, the creation of contracts, the buying and
transferring of various construction materials interstate, and
fundraising. 44 A burden on a construction project that affected these
transactions, proponents argue, "would substantially affect interstate
commerce."' 45 This argument presents a more literal link with
interstate economic activity that focuses on the construction process in
the life of a building. Even if the argument is over building a simple
extension, RLUIPA's supporters argue that the economic effects are
grave.
Finally, RLUIPA, in effect, regulates zoning laws,146 and Congress
believed the zoning laws and the Act fell within the appropriate area
of congressional power. 147  Transcripts from the congressional
hearings preceding the passage of RLUIPA show that Congress
140. See Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 204-05 (5th Cir.
2000) (finding the Fair Housing Amendments Act constitutional). The court
rationalized that any discriminatory act that interfered with the purchase, sale, or
rental of residential property was an act that Congress could regulate to assist an
economic activity. Id. at 205-06.
141. Id. The Fair Housing Amendments Act makes it illegal to "discriminate in the
sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or
renter because of a handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(2000).
142. Groome Res., 234 F.3d at 208. The Fifth Circuit noted that it was "further
supported in [its] determination that discrimination infringing on the rental, purchase,
and sale of real estate is activity 'economic in nature,' by the broad reading given to
'economic activity' by other courts." Id.
143. Reply Brief at 5-6, Elsinore (No. 01-4842) (citing Campus
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 585 (1997)).
144. Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional
Zoning Practices, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 929, 990-91 (2000).
145. See, e.g., id. at 991 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
146. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens.
Hatch and Kennedy).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000); 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7774-75.
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intended RLUIPA to apply to economic activities. For example, the
hearings show a need for legislation addressing religious rights in
zoning laws focused solely on the rights to "build, buy or rent."'48
Thus, Congress viewed buying or renting land, and building on land,
as economic activity.'49 If the Supreme Court agreed with Congress
that RLUIPA regulates economic activities, the Court would next
consider whether the Act has a suitable jurisdictional element
narrowing the scope. The next section presents that argument.
2. RLUIPA Contains a Jurisdictional Element
Another factor distinguishing RLUIPA from laws the Court has
struck down under the Commerce Clause, such as § 13981 of VAWA
and GFSZA, is that RLUIPA contains a jurisdictional element.
Section 2(B) of RLUIPA defines the scope of the Act as reaching
"any case in which.., the substantial burden affects, or removal of
that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability.""15  Proponents of
RLUIPA argue that this clause is a jurisdictional hook that limits
RLUIPA's reach to activities that fall within Congress's regulatory
power under the Commerce Clause.' 5 '
In contrast, the statutes in both Morrison and Lopez lacked such a
jurisdictional element, which is one of the reasons that the Supreme
Court invalidated them. The Morrison Court asserted that the lack of
a jurisdictional element was essential to its holdings in both Morrison
and Lopez: "The second consideration that we found important in
analyzing [the statute in Lopez] was that the statute contained 'no
express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete
set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce."" 52 Therefore, for a law to
survive a Commerce Clause challenge, it should have a satisfactory
jurisdictional element that limits the scope of the act to cases which
fall within the ambit of the Commerce Clause.
Accordingly, proponents of RLUIPA, such as the Becket Fund,
148. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774.
149. However, although Congress believes these activities to be economic, the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter on that question.
150. 42 U.S.C § 2000cc(a)(2)(B).
151. Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Elsinore
Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 01-
4842), available at http://www.rluipa.org/cases/Elsinore-TBF-
CommerceClauseBrief.pdf.
152. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000) (quoting United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995)). The Court then went on to hold that like
GFSZA, VAWA also cast its net over a "purely intrastate" category of violent crime,
and thus did not fall within the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 613.
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argue that because RLUIPA contains a jurisdictional element, the law
is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 5 3 The statute by its
own terms, proponents argue, applies solely to activities affecting
"commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or within
the Indian tribes. ' 154 Congress, the argument goes, immunized the
statute from a Commerce Clause challenge by inserting the
jurisdictional element because any conduct that satisfies §
2000cc(a)(2)(B)'s jurisdictional requirement necessarily satisfies the
language of the Commerce Clause.'55 If the facts at bar compel a
determination that the activity falls outside the boundaries of the
commerce power, the conduct falls outside the reach of RLUIPA as
well.'56
Both the Westchester Day School and Freedom Baptist Church
courts noted the presence of the jurisdictional element in upholding
RLUIPA. Because the courts found that subsection (a)(2)(B) of
RLUIPA contained an adequate jurisdictional element, the courts
both held that "defendants [were] reduced to questioning the
congressional findings.., just as the Supreme Court did in
Morrison."'157 Invoking Lopez and Morrison, lower courts consider
the presence of a jurisdictional element significant. These courts show
deference to Congress, and do not question whether RLUIPA
regulates an economic activity. However, they also rely on the
questionable proposition that a jurisdictional element saves a statute
from a constitutional challenge. Even if the Supreme Court finds
RLUIPA's jurisdictional element adequate, the Court may next
consider whether Congress needed to show extensive findings that the
Act regulates economic activity.
3. Congress Did Not Need to Show Extensive Findings
RLUIPA's legislative history contains only limited congressional
findings supporting the assertion that RLUIPA regulates activity in
interstate commerce.'58 During the congressional hearings prior to the
passage of RLUIPA, Congress heard some evidence that RLUIPA as
written regulated economic, interstate activity. For example,
Congress noted that testimony by Marc D. Stern159 showed:
153. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
154. Reply Brief at 3, Elsinore (No. 01-4842) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc(a)(2)(B)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 3-4 (citing United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002)).
157. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-16); Freedom Baptist Church v.
Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
158. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7774-78 (daily ed. July 17, 2000) (joint statement
of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).
159. Marc D. Stern is the co-director of the Commission on Law and Social Action
of the American Jewish Congress. He is one of the country's foremost experts on the
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[11n each case, the burden on religious exercise, or removal of that
burden, will affect interstate commerce. This will most commonly
be proved by showing that the burden prevents a specific economic
transaction in commerce, such as a construction project, purchase or
rental of a building, or an interstate shipment of religious goods. 16°
Stern's testimony supports Congress's determination that RLUIPA
regulates interstate commerce.
Congress specifically found that placing burdens on religious land
use, such as construction projects, substantially affects interstate
commerce.1 6' This suggests that the activity RLUIPA regulates has a
large economic impact.
The lack of any further findings does not mean that a court must
determine that the Commerce Clause cannot render RLUIPA
constitutional. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that it does not
require Congress to have findings of a regulated activity's substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 162  The Lopez Court stated that
"Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. '163
Therefore, the lack of congressional findings alone probably will not
doom RLUIPA.
Such findings, however, may help the government's case in the face
of a constitutional challenge. As the Court noted in Lopez, if findings
exist, they could "enable [the court] to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate
commerce,"'164 even in cases in which the regulated activity, on its face,
does not appear to affect interstate commerce.1 65
The statute in Morrison contained extensive findings.1 66 However,
the findings alone were not enough to overcome the negative analysis
of the other elements.1 67 In Lopez, neither GFSZA nor its legislative
history contained "congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone."
law of church and state. See http://www.trincoll.edu/
depts/csrpol/REligion%20and%2OLiberal%2ODemocracy/stern.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2004).
160. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. June 16, 1998) (testimony of Marc D. Stern).
161. See id.; H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 28 (1999).
162. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
163. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
164. Id. at 563.
165. Id. at 562-68.
166. See infra note 221 (establishing the extensive congressional findings of a link
between VAWA and economic activity).
167. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000); see also infra note 222 and
accompanying text (establishing that the Morrison Court did not allow extensive
congressional findings to compel a holding that VAWA was constitutional under the
Commerce Clause).
168. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
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Therefore, the Court could not alter its decision to strike down
GFSZA as unconstitutional.
169
As the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence
shows, empirical findings are, at best, only a secondary basis for
showing that Congress had Commerce Clause authority to regulate an
activity.
4. RLUIPA Has a Direct Link to Interstate Commerce
The two cases upholding the constitutionality of RLUIPA under
the Commerce Clause did not discuss at length whether the link
between zoning laws and economic activity was attenuated or direct. 70
The best explanation for the courts' dismissal of the issue was that
RLUIPA regulates zoning ordinances, which these courts saw as
constituting interstate commerce by definition, making the Act
different from the laws in Lopez and Morrison that the Court held
regulated criminal activity.17'
a. The Laws in Question in Lopez and Morrison Had a Very
Attenuated Link to Interstate Commerce
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court found that the links between the
statutes and economic activity were too attenuated for the statute to
fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Court in
Morrison interpreted Lopez as hinging in part "on the fact that the
link between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce was attenuated."'72  In Lopez, the Court rejected the
argument that GFSZA had a link to interstate commerce because the
Court feared creating a slippery slope: To hold that such a criminal
law was economic under the Commerce Clause would open a door
through which Congress could regulate violent crime, as well as any
and all activities that have any possibility of leading to violent crime,
even if such activities are only tenuously linked to interstate
commerce.' The Morrison Court found the slippery slope argument
persuasive as well.'74 Proponents would argue that RLUIPA does not
169. Id.
170. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Viii. of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237-38
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Freedom Baptist Church v. Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp.
2d 857,865-68 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
171. See Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38; Freedom Baptist Church,
204 F. Supp. 2d at 866.
172. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67).
173. See id. at 612-13 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564) ("We rejected [the argument
in Lopez] because [it] would permit Congress to 'regulate not only all violent crime,
but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce.").
174. Id. at 615-16 ("Petitioner's reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to
regulating violence but may... be applied equally as well to family law and other
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give rise to the slippery slope concerns because it has a direct link to
interstate commerce. 75
b. RL UIPA Directly Affects Interstate Commerce
The Freedom Baptist Church and Westchester Day School courts did
not spend much time establishing that RLUIPA's link to economic
activity was direct. 7 6 In Freedom Baptist Church, the court focused its
analysis instead on the distinction between criminal activity, which
Congress does not have authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate, and economic activity, which Congress does have such power
to regulate. 177 The Freedom Baptist Church court believed that Lopez
and Morrison placed limitations only on Congress's regulation of
criminal activity.178 Congress's authority to regulate economic activity
remained, to the court, very broad. 179 The sale or rental of property is
an economic endeavor, and so the court found the activity at issue in
the case to be economic.18 0
Likewise, the Westchester Day court noted that Congress retained
its broad power to regulate economic activity under the Commerce
Clause.18" ' Since the court understood economic activity broadly, the
court found that the "plaintiff's activities in operating an orthodox
Jewish day school is an economic endeavor within the meaning of the
areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce,
and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.").
175. See, e.g., Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 5,
Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(No. 01-4842), available at http://www.rluipa.org/cases/Elsinore-TBF-
CommerceClauseBrief.pdf.
176. See Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38; Freedom Baptist Church,
204 F. Supp. 2d at 865-68.
177. Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 866. The court noted that the
Supreme Court delineated what the Freedom Baptist Church court saw to be "a bright
line between the exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power in criminal cases
versus its application in those Acts involving regulation of economic activity." Id. The
Freedom Baptist court thus presumed that if a law was not criminal, it would more
easily pass muster under a Commerce Clause challenge. See id.
178. Id. at 866-67.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 866.
181. Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 237. The Westchester Day School
court found that:
Morrison ... left no doubt that the economic regulatory regime [in the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence before 1995] remains very
much alive: "Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates
that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce,
the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor."
Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (citing United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995))).
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Commerce Clause,' 82 and saw no need to discuss whether the link to
interstate commerce and economic activity was direct or attenuated.8 3
5. RLUIPA Does Not Threaten the Dividing Line Between What Is
National and What Is Local
The final argument in favor of upholding RLUIPA is that on a
purely public policy level, RLUIPA in no way blurs the line between
conduct that Congress may regulate and conduct that only the states
may regulate."8 The Becket Fund, in an amicus curiae brief filed in
support of RLUIPA in Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake
Elsinore,8 ' argued that RLUIPA does not replace local zoning boards
with a federal zoning board, nor does it provide religious groups a
"blanket exemption" from such systems, because RLUIPA protects
only against laws that "both substantially burden religious exercise
and tread into national territory by affecting interstate commerce." 86
Thus, proponents argue, RLUIPA does not offend notions of
federalism and falls within Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.
Although most of the limited case law in the area has upheld
RLUIPA on Commerce Clause grounds, there is tremendous
academic support for finding RLUIPA unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause with no other leg to stand on. Accordingly, this
Note next discusses the argument for finding that the Commerce
Clause cannot serve as a basis for finding RLUIPA constitutional.
B. No Help: The Commerce Clause Does Not Render RL UIPA
Constitutional
Although the Supreme Court generally presumes the
constitutionality of congressional legislation, "[t]here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution.' 18' In early 2003, Judge Steven Wilson in the
182. Id. at 238.
183. See id.
184. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. The Lopez Court expressed concern that allowing
Congress to regulate school zones would enable Congress to encroach upon activities
that localities traditionally regulate. Id. at 567.
185. 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
186. Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 2, Elsinore
Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 01-
4842), available at http://www.rluipa.org/cases/Elsinore-TBF-
CommerceClauseBrief.pdf. (citing Freedom Baptist Church v. Township of
Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867-68 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
187. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citing
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
452 (1938)). The quote comes from a famous footnote, famous partially because it
was the first hint that the Supreme Court might depart from the rational basis test.
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Central District of California became the first judge to find RLUIPA
unconstitutional.188 In a published opinion, Judge Wilson held that
Congress had violated its Fourteenth Amendment powers in drafting
the legislation, but also stated that Congress may have had the power
to draft the Act under the Commerce Clause. 89 Judge Wilson noted
that neither party had submitted an argument regarding RLUIPA's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, and he instructed both
sides to do so. However, before the oral hearings could occur, Judge
Wilson held that RLUIPA violated Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause.19 This section explores the reasons for finding
that RLUIPA violates Congress's Commerce Clause authority
because RLUIPA regulates non-economic, local activity; lacks an
adequate jurisdictional element; does not contain sufficient
congressional findings; and violates notions of federalism.
1. RLUIPA Does Not Regulate Economic Activity
The primary contention against the constitutionality of RLUIPA is
the argument that zoning ordinances do not constitute economic
activity. The Supreme Court, in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
has struck down laws as unconstitutional on the basis that the laws did
not regulate economic activity. The Lopez Court stressed that the law
in question was "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms."' 91 Moreover, the Lopez Court stated
that "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.""19
The Morrison Court also weighed the economic factor heavily in its
analysis of VAWA, concluding that despite congressional findings to
the contrary, gender-motivated violence simply is not economic in
nature. 193
See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 75-76
(1980). Although Justice Stone wrote the opinion, other justices believed he accepted
the draft of this footnote from his law clerk, Louis Lusky, almost without any change.
Id. at 76. Lusky later said that the quoted portion of the footnote was added at the
request of Chief Justice Hughes. Id.
188. Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1183
(C.D. Cal. 2003). To date, no other courts have declared the land use portion of
RLUIPA unconstitutional.
189. See id. at 1182 (Judge Wilson stated that "[tJo the extent that RLUIPA is not a
valid exercise of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act and its
legislative history imply an alternative source of congressional authority: the
Commerce Clause").
190. This decision was unpublished. See www.rluipa.org/cases/Elsinore/html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2004). Part II.B of this Note addresses the reasons that Judge Wilson
likely believed that RLUIPA was a violation of Congress's Commerce Clause power.
191. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
192. Id. at 560.
193. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000); see also Pullen, supra
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Opponents of RLUIPA argue that although "the building of new
religious facilities and the expansion of existing religious facilities"
have some link to interstate commerce, there is no substantial
relationship between the two.'94 Specifically, the only instance when
zoning laws affect interstate commerce is during the time in which the
religious building is under construction. The building stage, however,
is a relatively brief period in the entire life of the building, which can
be very long. 95  Because the window in which zoning laws affect
interstate commerce is so small, the link to interstate commerce is not
substantial enough to bring RLUIPA within Congress's Commerce
Clause power.196
Opponents of RLUIPA build their argument from the premise that
the Supreme Court has defined economic activity in very narrow
terms.197 As one commentator has noted:
[Liand use regulation fails to satisfy the Court's narrow definition of
economic activity. Land use regulation itself is not an economic
endeavor and does not involve a transaction or the buying and
selling of goods. Of course, land use regulation might encourage or
prevent future economic transactions, such as the buying and selling
of construction materials. Nonetheless, in Lopez and Morrison, the
Court held that the economic nature of the activity is key, not the
economic effects.198
Challengers argue that the Court's narrow definition of economic
activity renders RLUIPA unconstitutional.
Moreover, RLUIPA's adversaries claim that the economic
considerations involved in land use regulation "merely influence land
use regulation.' 99 Critics of RLUIPA argue that since non-economic
note 25, at 1059 ("Domestic violence is historically a crime regulated by the laws of
individual states ...."). But see Michael Bono, Judicial Limitations on Congressional
Power Under United States v. Morrison, 2 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 229, 253 (2001)
(describing violence against women as a problem "that [alffects the economy and
commerce"); Melissa Irr, United States v. Morrison; An Analysis of the Diminished
Effect of Congressional Findings in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and a Criticism of
the Abandonment of the Rational Basis Test, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 815, 836 (2001) ("The
Court could have viewed gender-based violence the same way it viewed racial
discrimination, because each bars its target from full participation in the national
economy." (citation omitted)); Peter J. Luizzo, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic and State University: The Constitutionality of the Violence Against
Women Act-Recognizing that Violence Targeted at Women Affects Interstate
Commerce, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 367, 369 (1997) (arguing that gender-motivated
violence "substantially affects interstate commerce").
194. Walsh, supra note 15, at 210.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
198. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 1280 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Shapiro
derives from Lopez the suggestion that "to meet the definition of economic activity, a
regulated activity must involve economic enterprise and commercial transactions." Id.
at 1279.
199. Id. at 1281 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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factors are equally important in land use regulation, a court would err
in classifying zoning regulation as economic. 2° A zoning law study by
the American Law Institute supports this argument.2 1 The Standard
Zoning Enabling Act suggests that concern for public safety and
aesthetics was the original catalyst for land use zoning.2°2 Because
opponents of RLUIPA argue that the Act does not regulate economic
activity, they do not reach the argument of whether RLUIPA
regulates interstate activity. To support the non-economic
characterization of RLUIPA, opponents add that the Act's
jurisdictional element is too general.
2. The Jurisdictional Element of RLUIPA Is Not Restrictive Enough
The Supreme Court requires that to be constitutional, a statute
must not only contain a jurisdictional element, but also the
jurisdictional element must adequately narrow the scope of the law so
that a court can decide on a "case-by-case" basis that the activity the
law regulates affects interstate commerce.2 3 The lack of an effective
jurisdictional element was essential to the Supreme Court striking
down GFSZA and VAWA °.2 ' Although RLUIPA contains a
jurisdictional element,2 °5 challengers argue that the language Congress
used is too broad to sufficiently bar cases that are not within the scope
of the Commerce Clause from falling within RLUIPA.2°  Notably,
Congress could have drafted RLUIPA more narrowly to avoid any
constitutional challenge. Congress could have limited RLUIPA's
scope "to the construction of new religious facilities or the expansion
of existing facilities. 27 Critics of RLUIPA argue that if Congress had
limited jurisdiction in this way, courts could adequately analyze
RLUIPA challenges on a "case-by-case" basis.208 Understandably,
critics would argue that the Westchester Day School and Freedom
Baptist courts did not appropriately apply Lopez, since the courts did
200. Id. (citations omitted).
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. Id. (citations omitted).
203. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
204. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at
562) ("The second consideration that we found important in analyzing [the statute in
Lopez] was that the statute contained 'no express jurisdictional element which might
limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce."').
205. For a definition of "jurisdictional element," see supra note 97.
206. Section 2(B) of RLUIPA defines the scope of the Act as reaching "any case in
which... th[e] substantial burden would affect, commerce with the foreign nations,
among the several States, or with the Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2000).
207. Walsh, supra note 15, at 210.
208. Id.
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not inquire into the effectiveness of RLUIPA's jurisdictional
element. 09
Absent a narrower jurisdictional element that would include the
preceding language, however, critics worry that RLUIPA is too broad
and presents an opportunity for Congress to regulate activities
reserved for state regulation."0  This slippery slope argument
expresses concern that Congress will encroach upon activities
traditionally within state jurisdiction. For example, RLUIPA allows
religious groups to ignore historical landmark laws, which are
paradigmatic local areas of regulation.211  According to critics of
RLUIPA, the statute's broad language, combined with the lack of a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce and the absence of an
effective jurisdictional element, necessitates the finding that RLUIPA
does not fit into the third category of economic activities that
Congress has the authority to regulate.212
3. The Congressional Findings Are Inadequate
Congress does not need to present findings of a link between the
activity and interstate commerce,213 but if a statute's constitutionality
is extremely doubtful, courts require findings to uphold the statute to
which a constitutional challenge is presented.214 Critics of RLUIPA
argue that this Act necessitates more extensive congressional
findings.2" RLUIPA's opponents distrust Congress's rationale in
enacting the statute and so argue that a court reviewing RLUIPA
needs congressional findings to uphold the statute as constitutional.1 6
Notably, when a statute facing a Commerce Clause challenge
violates the other Lopez prongs of analysis, as many believe RLUIPA
does, the Supreme Court will turn to congressional findings, if any, to
209. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Viii. of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting the presence of a jurisdictional element and failing to inquire
whether it narrowed the scope of the law to activities arising under the Commerce
Clause); see also Freedom Baptist Church v. Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp.
2d 857, 867 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that because there was a jurisdictional element in
RLUIPA, "defendants [were] reduced to question[ing]... the congressional
findings.., just as the Supreme Court did in Morrison").
210. Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (citations omitted).
211. See Throop, supra note 70, at 16.
212. Id. (citations omitted); see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
214. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (noting that
congressional findings from the discussion of whether to enact the law are necessary,
as the courts demand the findings to gain insight into Congress's thought process.).
215. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 15, at 209-10.
216. The Lopez Court hinted at such a lack of confidence: "Simply because
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2. (quoting




seek out evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce.217
The record of congressional hearings before the drafting and passage
of RLUIPA shows almost no findings that the exercise of religion has
a relationship to interstate commerce.2 18 Although the few findings
that exist show a link to economic activity,2 19 critics call these findings
insufficient:
First, the RLUIPA is not limited to the building of new churches or
the physical expansion of existing churches. The RLUIPA applies
to any land use function such as permits for increased occupancy or
a variance to change the use of the property.... These types of land
use functions have no relation to interstate commerce and their
constitutionality cannot be [easily] resurrected by one commercial
application of the RLUIPA.tl°
Moreover, comparatively, the findings are not examples of extensive
congressional findings.221 If the congressional findings are insufficient,
they cannot save RLUIPA from a judicial determination of
unconstitutionality if a court finds that RLUIPA does not regulate
interstate commerce and does not have a sufficient jurisdictional
element.
Even if the congressional findings were sufficient, the Supreme
Court would still probably not uphold RLUIPA based on the findings
alone. Although Congress showed findings of a link between gender-
motivated violence and interstate commerce in passing VAWA, these
findings did not sway the Court from the conclusion that VAWA
violated Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Morrison Court
noted that:
217. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 209.
In Lopez, after finding that the challenged act had no substantial effect on
interstate commerce "visible to the naked eye," the Court turned to
congressional findings to search for evidence of the Act's substantial relation
to interstate commerce. Although not formally required to make factual
findings about a particular law's relationship to interstate commerce, the
Court strongly suggested that such a finding should be made when
promulgating a law whose relation to interstate commerce is not obvious.
Id. (citations omitted).
218. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7776-77 (2000); see also infra note 221
(establishing that Congress heard extensive testimony of the link between gender-
motivated violence and economic activity before passing VAWA).
219. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
220. Walsh, supra note 15, at 210 (citation omitted).
221. Compare the minimal testimony regarding the link between land use and
economic activity with the extensive testimony the Senate relied upon to assert that
domestic violence had a profound economic effect before passing VAWA. See
generally S. Rep. No. 103-138 (1993). Before passing VAWA, "the Senate found that
'[g]ender-based crimes and fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement, reduces
employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer
spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy."'
Leonard Karp & Laura C. Belleau, Federal Law and Domestic Violence: The Legacy
of the Violence Against Women Act, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 173, 178
(1999) (citing S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 42).
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In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced in
Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the
serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and
their families. But the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation.222
In short, because of RLUIPA's shortcomings, a court would need
more extensive congressional findings to uphold RLUIPA as
constitutional because of the lack of a sufficient jurisdictional element,
and the attenuated link between RLUIPA and interstate commerce.
4. The Link Between RLUIPA and Interstate Commerce Is
Attenuated
Just as proponents for RLUIPA assert that its effect on interstate
commerce is direct rather than attenuated, opponents of the Act
argue the opposite. Critics of RLUIPA operate under the assumption
that land use is not economic in nature. Therefore, the link between
the activity RLUIPA regulates and interstate commerce is as
attenuated as the link between the behaviors VAWA and GFSZA
regulated.223 Challengers argue that the only time when land use
regulation has any relation to interstate commerce is the short period
when a religious group is building a structure. The building process
represents a very limited time in the life of a building.224
Moreover, critics note that "Congress's reasoning in support of
RLUIPA is similar to the 'but-for causal chain' the Court rejected
when evaluating the GFSZA. ''225  According to the opponents of
RLUIPA, the thought process would proceed along these lines:
[I]n considering a land use ordinance restricting the ability of a
church to expand, a court would first have to infer that a church
222. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (citations omitted).
223. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Morrison Court
interpreted Lopez as hinging "in part on the fact that the link between gun possession
and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated." Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 612 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67). The Lopez Court feared that finding that
GFSZA-regulated economic activity would lead to a slippery slope by which Congress
could regulate far more activities. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 (rejecting the argument
that GFSZA might have a link to economic activity, because agreeing with that
argument would allow Congress to "regulate not only all violent crime, but all
activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to
interstate commerce"). The Morrison Court also noted its awareness of the slippery
slope the Court's holding could create if the Court agreed with Congress. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 612-13. As the Court stated, "Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not
limit Congress to regulating violence, but may ... be applied equally as well to family
law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of
marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly
significant." Id. at 615-16.
224. Walsh, supra note 15, at 210.
225. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 1284.
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intended to expand. The court would then have to make the
additional inference that the church's inability to expand would
somehow affect interstate commerce, perhaps by decreasing the
demand for interstate labor or interstate supplies. Thus, the number
and type of inferences one has to make to conclude that a religious
land use regulation affects interstate commerce is similar to the
reasoning the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in Lopez and
Morrison. 226
Critics find the rationale for finding that land use is connected to
interstate commerce too attenuated to qualify as a legitimate use of
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
5. RLUIPA Is Congress's Attempt to Legislate Beyond Its
Commerce Clause Power
The final argument against the constitutionality of RLUIPA sounds
in public policy: that RLUIPA is a congressional attempt to violate
the separation between church and state. As one critic of the law has
noted, "[RLUIPA] is a bill that would cause James Madison and the
other authors of the Constitution who abominated government
meddling in religion to gyrate in their crypts. And what is worse, it
sails under the false banner of promoting the free exercise of
religion." '22 7 Critics also protest that the law treats religious groups
more favorably than the average land owner. The Act therefore
violates principles of equality because equality dictates that courts
treat religious uses the "same as other uses." '228 From a zoning
standpoint, courts should base their treatment of religious groups on
the way the groups impact the community in which they are located.229
Finally, critics of RLUIPA worry about the public policy
implications of passing such a law. Critics believe that RLUIPA
places too strenuous a burden on local governments-a burden that is
nearly impossible to overcome. Critics argue that RLUIPA is so
powerful that a town would find using its zoning laws to stop a church
or temple's expansion impossible.230 Towns would also have no way
of preventing a religious group from destroying a historical landmark
to create more parking spaces.23'
Moreover, critics believe that local governments have substantial
reasons to enforce zoning laws against religious institutions. Religious
226. Id. at 1285 (citations omitted).
227. Ross K. Baker, Religious-Political Mix Makes a Bad Brew, L.A. Times, Sept.
11, 2000, at B7.
228. Opposition to RLUIPA: Redefining Religious Freedom (quoting Los
Angeles Assistant City Attorney Anthony S. Alperin), at http://atheism.about.com/
library/FAQs/cs/blcs rluipa opp.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter
Opposition to RLUIPA].
229. Id.
230. Baker, supra note 227, at B7.
231. Id.
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congregations, they claim, are either "so successful that they need to
expand," or they fall victim to a sort of factionalism.232 This
factionalism involves subsets of the congregation breaking apart to
form new congregations that wish to create their own church, yet still
wish to remain close to the original church. The result is that one
church soon breeds a new church within the vicinity.233 In short,
religious organizations ultimately succumb to one of two fates:
"gigantism" or "MitoSiS. ' '234 The problem for a locality is that the
churches inevitably take up more land, and most religious
organizations "typically, do not pay local property taxes.,
235
Perhaps this rationale is the reason that RLUIPA's main opponents
are "municipalities and local government associations-groups which
stand to lose the most if religious organizations can just ignore zoning
laws."'2 6 Critics are troubled because RLUIPA allows one specific
type of property owner to ignore "regulations written to protect the
common good. ' 23' These concerns show that critics object to
RLUIPA's virtually unlimited protection of religious institutions
which in turn may affect other segments of the community.
The arguments of RLUIPA's opponents more closely track the
Supreme Court's analysis of the Commerce Clause in Lopez and
Morrison. While Congress has improved upon the fatal flaws of
RFRA,238 RLUIPA arguably also applies in cases that are not within
Congress's Commerce Clause power.
This part presented arguments supporting and opposing a finding of
appropriate congressional power under the Commerce Clause with
respect to RLUIPA. Part III argues that RLUIPA is not an
appropriate exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.
III. RLUIPA VIOLATES THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
This Note argues that the Commerce Clause cannot serve as a basis
for RLUIPA's constitutionality. This part first examines appellate
courts' treatment of the Commerce Clause after the watershed





236. Opposition to RLUIPA, supra note 228.
237. Id. (quoting Jane Hague, the President of the National Association of
Counties).
238. Congress improved its religious legislation with RLUIPA because RLUIPA
includes additional sources of congressional power and has a narrower scope than
RFRA, as it covers only land use and institutionalized persons. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb (1993).
239. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). This decision solidified
the message that the Supreme Court's future Commerce Clause jurisprudence would
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such treatment, and the Lopez and Morrison decisions, RLUIPA does
not regulate only economic, interstate activity, but also regulates local,
non-economic activity. Finally, Part III contends that RLUIPA does
not have a sufficient jurisdictional element and creates a slippery
slope for congressional Commerce Clause authority.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court identified three categories of activity
that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause: activity
that either (1) uses the "channels of interstate commerce"; (2) uses
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce"; or (3) has a "substantial relation to interstate
commerce." 240 If zoning regulations, such as the land use portion of
RLUIPA,24' fall within Congress's Commerce Clause regulatory
scope, they must do so under the third category.242 But it is not clear
that RLUIPA satisfies even this standard. The Supreme Court, in
Lopez, articulated the four factors it would consider to determine the
constitutionality of a statute under the third category of Commerce
Clause regulation: (1) whether the statute regulates economic activity;
(2) whether the statute has a jurisdictional element that sufficiently
narrows its scope; (3) whether the regulated activity has a direct link
to interstate commerce; and (4) whether there are legislative findings
to support Congress's determination that the law in question falls
within the ambit of the Commerce Clause. 243
Because RLUIPA overrides local zoning laws,2" the
constitutionality of the land use portion of RLUIPA under the
Commerce Clause necessarily turns upon whether the Supreme Court
would categorize zoning laws as an activity Congress may regulate.245
This Note argues no. Although many cases arising under RLUIPA
will involve interstate commerce and economic activity,246 RLUIPA
also regulates activity that is not economic and has a tenuous link to
interstate commerce.247 Moreover, RLUIPA's jurisdictional element
is overbroad.2 48 Finally, Congress did not set forth extensive findings
hold congressional statutes to a much more stringent standard when facing a
Commerce Clause challenge.
240. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
241. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA
regulates zoning laws).
242. See supra note 94 (establishing that RLUIPA can regulate only activity falling
within the third category of Lopez).
243. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
244. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (establishing that religious
groups can invoke RLUIPA to ignore zoning laws).
245. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA
regulates zoning laws).
246. See supra Part II.A. (presenting the argument for finding that the Commerce
Clause supports RLUIPA's constitutionality).
247. See infra notes 295-307 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA
regulates activity that is not economic).
248. See infra notes 308-13 and accompanying text (showing that RLUIPA's
jurisdictional element does not sufficiently narrow its scope).
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to justify RLUIPA as an appropriate exercise of Commerce Clause
power.2 49 Therefore, this Note concludes that any court reviewing
RLUIPA must find that the Act does not fall within Congress's
Commerce Clause power.
A. Recent Commerce Clause Cases
Although there have been no federal circuit court decisions
addressing the constitutionality of the land use portion of RLUIPA,
several appellate courts have evaluated the constitutionality of other
statutes under the Commerce Clause since 2000. This section
examines how appellate courts have interpreted statutes and analyzed
jurisdictional elements under the Commerce Clause post-Lopez.
1. The Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation of Lopez and Morrison
Several appellate courts have upheld congressional statutes in the
face of Commerce Clause challenges on the basis of the statutes'
jurisdictional elements.2 0  Notably, courts have upheld statutes
involving gun possession2 1 and mandating child support252 under the
Commerce Clause-laws that at first glance have little relation to
interstate commerce. However, in United States v. Monts, the court
identified a much more direct link between child support payments
and economic activity than exists with RLUIPA;253 in the other two
instances, the courts misread Lopez. For example, after finding that a
particular law contained a jurisdictional element, the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Pritchett54 did not engage in further analysis 255 to
support its conclusion that the law fell within the third category of
Lopez,25 6 that is, that it had a "substantial relation to interstate
249. See infra notes 314-24 and accompanying text (arguing that the congressional
findings to support RLUIPA's link to interstate commerce are inadequate).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Pritchett, 327 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
statute prohibiting receiving and possessing a stolen firearm); United States v.
Jackubowski, No. 02-3621, 2003 WL 2013054 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2003) (upholding a law
that prohibits a felon from possessing a gun); United States v. Monts, 311 F.3d 993
(10th Cir. 2002) (finding that a statute making failure to pay child support for a child
residing in another state a criminal offense is constitutional under the Commerce
Clause). For a definition of "jurisdictional element," see supra note 97.
251. Pritchett, 327 F.3d at 1183; Jackubowski, 2003 WL 2013054.
252. Monts, 311 F.3d at 996-97.
253. See id. at 993.
254. 327 F.3d at 1183.
255. For example, the court did not determine whether the jurisdictional element
was sufficient to limit the scope of the statute to interstate economic activity. Cf
United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). There, the Ninth Circuit
accurately noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison
however, reject the view that a jurisdictional element, standing alone, serves to shield
a statute from constitutional infirmities under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 1125.
256. Pritchett, 327 F.3d at 1185-86.
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commerce." 57  The Eleventh Circuit noted that it did not read
anything in Lopez to suggest that the lower courts should no longer
rely on the finding that a statute contains a "minimal nexus" with
interstate commerce to find that statute constitutional. 8
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis of Lopez is flawed because the
court completely ignored language in both Lopez and Morrison
suggesting that a court must consider other factors in addition to the
jurisdictional element when deciding whether a statute is
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 259 The Morrison Court
noted that a jurisdictional element "may establish that the enactment
is in pursuance of Congress'[s] regulation of interstate commerce," or
that it may provide support for such a conclusion 6.2 ' The Court did
not say that mere existence of a jurisdictional element ensured that
the jurisdictional element was adequate. Because the Eleventh
Circuit relied solely on the jurisdictional element of the statute, 6' the
law upheld in that case cannot serve as an adequate benchmark for
determining whether zoning laws fall within Congress's regulatory
scope. Lopez mandates that courts must determine the adequacy of a
jurisdictional element. 62 Because RLUIPA's jurisdictional element
does not sufficiently limit the scope of the Act, a court should find
that RLUIPA cannot survive a Commerce Clause challenge.263
2. Other Commerce Clause Interpretations
The Tenth Circuit in Monts26 upheld the constitutionality of the
Child Support Recovery Act ("CSRA"), 2 6' and the Deadbeat Parents
Punishment Act ("DPPA"). 266 A woman sued her ex-husband under
the Acts,267 and he, in turn, challenged their constitutionality.26 The
257. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
258. See Pritchett, 327 F.3d at 1185.
259. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000).
260. Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
261. See Pritchett, 327 F.3d at 1185-86.
262. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (requiring that a statute contain not simply a
jurisdictional element, but a jurisdictional element that succeeds in ensuring "through
case-by-case inquiry," that the act regulates activity affecting interstate commerce).
263. See infra notes 310-13 and accompanying text (confirming that RLUIPA's
jurisdictional element does not adequately limit the scope of the Act).
264. United States v. Monts, 311 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2002).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1) (2000). A person violates the CSRA if he or she
"willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who resides in
another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer than 1 year,
or is greater than $5,000." Id.
266. Id. § 228(a)(3) (2000). The DPPA makes it a federal offense for someone to
"willfully fail[] to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who resides in
another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer than 2 years,
or is greater than $10,000." Id.
267. Monts, 311 F.3d at 995. James Arthur Monts, Jr. married Diane Cooper in
New York in 1973. Id. Cooper gave birth to a daughter in 1974. Id. The couple
separated soon after their daughter's birth and on October 30, 1975, a Westchester
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Tenth Circuit held that the statutes were constitutional because they
involved the "regulation of a court-ordered obligation to pay money
in interstate commerce. '26 9  Conversely, zoning ordinances do not
directly address interstate commerce. Zoning laws and RLUIPA
regulate non-economic, local activity, such as parking and having
people congregate in a home.270
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit deemed the Acts' jurisdictional
elements sufficient because they "requir[ed] as an essential element
that the defendant reside in a different state than the child for whom
support is owed. '271  That jurisdictional element differs from
RLUIPA's in that it explicitly limits its scope to two parties residing in
different states. 2 The jurisdictional elements in CSRA and DPPA
guard against the creation of a slippery slope: Congress is not
regulating any activity that remains in a locality. 3 RLUIPA, on the
other hand, threatens the line between what is national and what is
local, 274 and its jurisdictional element does not prevent the Act from
applying in cases involving local activity5
Moreover, CSRA and DPPA apply only in situations when an
economic transaction-the payment of child support-is involved.276
Conversely, RLUIPA applies in non-economic situations, such as
when a member of a religious group sues under the statute to enjoin a
local zoning order that he refrain from having other members of his
religious group congregate in his home. 7
Had Congress limited the scope of RLUIPA,278 the Act might also
County court ordered Monts to pay child support of fifty dollars a week to Cooper.
Id. Monts moved out of New York State around that time and paid no child support.
Id. After several failed attempts to enforce the child support order, Cooper located
Monts in Virginia and enforced the order in that state. Id.
268. Id. at 996.
269. Id. at 997.
270. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
271. Monts, 311 F.3d at 997 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)).
272. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (2001) (applying if the offensive conduct affects
commerce "among the several States").
273. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1), (3); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2). To prevail on the
claim, a religious group suing under RLUIPA need only allege that if the locality had
allowed them to undertake the construction project in question, they may have
ordered materials from another state. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text
(presenting argument that halting extensive construction projects has implications
affecting interstate commerce).
274. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA allows
Congress to regulate activity that the states traditionally regulate).
275. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (giving examples of RLUIPA
applying in cases involving local activity). For an example of a way Congress could
have written RLUIPA's jurisdictional element to narrow its scope, see text
accompanying supra note 207.
276. See Monts, 311 F.3d at 997.
277. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (showing examples of
individuals and religious groups invoking RLUIPA to uphold non-economic activity).
278. See supra notes 207-08 (arguing that RLUIPA's jurisdictional element is too
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be closely linked to interstate commerce. However, RLUIPA
regulates activity that is local and not economic2 79 and therefore,
violates the Commerce Clause.
The jurisdictional element and scope of RLUIPA more closely
resemble a child pornography law s° that the Ninth Circuit struck
down as unconstitutional as applied in United States v. McCoy.2 11 In
McCoy, the government prosecuted the defendant, Rhonda McCoy,
for violation of the statute, 82 and she challenged the statute's
constitutionality. 28
3
The Ninth Circuit focused its Commerce Clause analysis on
whether the statute fell within the Lopez category.28 4 The Ninth
Circuit also tailored its analysis to resolve only whether the
government's application of the statute in that case had violated the
Commerce Clause. 285 The court found that the McCoy photo had no
economic impact on interstate commerce as the McCoys were not
going to sell the photograph,286 that there was no link, attenuated or
otherwise, between the McCoys's conduct and interstate commerce,287
broad to support the Act's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause). Congress
could have limited the scope of RLUIPA to apply strictly to construction projects, or
to the sale and purchase of land, thereby ensuring that the Act would regulate only
interstate commerce.
279. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA
regulates non-economic, local activity).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who: knowingly possesses 1 or more books, magazines,
periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual
depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials
which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means
including by computer, if-
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
281. 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
282. Id. at 1115. In April 2000, Rhonda, her husband, and Kala, their ten-year-old
daughter, were painting Easter eggs and taking photographs. Id. In one photograph,
Rhonda and Kala appeared partially unclothed with their genitals exposed. Id. Two
months later, a manager for the Naval Fleet Exchange came across the picture after
Rhonda dropped the film off for development. Id. The manager contacted the U.S.
Naval Criminal Investigation Service who, along with the FBI and San Diego Police
Department, conducted a search of Rhonda's home pursuant to a search warrant. Id.
The government filed charges against Rhonda in January of 2001. Id. at 1116.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1117.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1122.
287. See id. at 1122-23 ("[S]imple intrastate possession of home-grown child
pornography not intended for distribution or exchange is 'not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity."' (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000))).
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and that the jurisdictional element failed to limit the reach of the
statute. 288 The Ninth Circuit declined to decide the constitutionality of
the statute on its face,289 but held that the application of the statute in
that case was unconstitutional.2 9
RLUIPA is similar to the statute in McCoy because the
jurisdictional element in RLUIPA does not ensure that the statute
will apply only in circumstances affecting interstate commerce. 91
Moreover, while RLUIPA will cover situations which are economic
and involve interstate commerce,292 importantly, it will also cover
situations which are non-economic and do not involve actors or
activities in multiple states.293  For example, individuals can invoke
RLUIPA to override occupancy laws, which are local and non-
economic. 94 Therefore, in theory, an appellate court could narrow a
RLUIPA issue before it and focus its analysis on whether the
particular application of RLUIPA in that case is constitutional,
avoiding the question of whether the statute can stand. If, however, a
court decides to review the Act itself, the court must conclude that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power in passing RLUIPA.
B. The Commerce Clause Does Not Save RL UIPA
RLUIPA does not satisfy any of the four factors the Supreme Court
used in Lopez to determine whether GFSZA was constitutional under
the Commerce Clause. Specifically, RLUIPA does not regulate
economic activity, has only an attenuated link to interstate commerce,
has an insufficient jurisdictional element, and violates notions of
federalism. This section argues that because RLUIPA does not satisfy
any of the factors the Lopez Court articulated, it lacks support under
the Commerce Clause.
288. Id. at 1124.
The language of the jurisdictional hook in question here fails totally to
achieve that purpose. It not only fails to limit the reach of the statute to any
category or categories of cases that have a particular effect on interstate
commerce, but, to the contrary, it encompasses virtually every case
imaginable, so long as any modern-day photographic equipment or material
has been used.
Id.
289. Id. at 1132.
290. Id. at 1131.
291. See supra notes 60-74, 207-12 and accompanying text.
292. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). For example, RLUIPA would apply in a case
in which a zoning law prevented a religious group from continuing an ongoing
building project. The group may well be ordering materials and supplies, as well as
using builders from other states. In that case, the Commerce Clause clearly allows
Congress to regulate such an activity, as it is economic in nature and involves multiple
states.
293. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (showing examples of non-
economic, local activity that RLUIPA regulates).
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1. RLUIPA Regulates Non-Economic, Local Activity
The Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison sharply limited the
definition of economic activity.295 The Court dictated that if a law
regulates non-economic activity, that law cannot survive a Commerce
Clause challenge.2 96  As one commentator noted, "to meet the
definition of economic activity, a regulated activity must involve
economic enterprise and commercial transactions."297 There are many
instances of land use which do not necessarily involve commercial
transactions or economic enterprise.2 98 For example, no economic
enterprise is involved if the land use laws regulate where cars may
park, how many people may be in the building at once, or what sort of
conduct may occur on the land.2 99 Those situations do not affect
commerce, whether interstate or otherwise.3" By encompassing such
conduct, the statute regulates non-economic activity and, therefore,
falls outside the scope of the Commerce Clause.
In upholding RLUIPA against Commerce Clause challenges, the
two district courts to uphold RLUIPA failed to apply an appropriately
narrow definition of economic activity. The courts in Westchester Day
School v. Village of Mamaroneck"1 and Freedom Baptist Church v.
Township of Middletown °" erred in holding that RLUIPA regulates
economic activity because they did not take into account all of the
ways religious groups can apply RLUIPA. °3 The courts assumed that
RLUIPA would apply only to situations involving interstate
commerce and did not properly analyze the Act's jurisdictional
element.3" RLUIPA has far-reaching implications, and individuals
can invoke the statute in situations where there is no economic
295. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). "[I]n Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that the
economic nature of the activity is key, not the economic effects." Shapiro, supra note
50, at 1280.
296. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (holding that VAWA was unconstitutional because
it regulated "[g]ender-motivated crimes" which are not economic activity); Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561 (striking down GFSZA as unconstitutional because it regulated
criminal, and not economic, activity).
297. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 1279.
298. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (giving examples of local, non-
economic activity RLUIPA regulates).
299. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (delineating all of the ways in
which religious groups can invoke RLUIPA).
300. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (delineating all of the ways in
which religious groups can invoke RLUIPA).
301. 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
302. 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
303. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (delineating all of the ways in
which religious groups can invoke RLUIPA).
304. See generally Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 230; Freedom Baptist
Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 857.
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activity involved. 0  Supporters of RLUIPA argue that the Act
regulates economic activity, because religious groups can invoke the
Act against zoning laws that would keep them from beginning a
construction project, or cause them to halt a construction project
already underway.3 °6 However, other applications of RLUIPA have
no connection to economic activity. For example, if an individual
invokes RLUIPA to prevent the congregation of people in a private
home for weekly prayer, no economic transactions are involved.
RLUIPA's regulation of non-economic activity, such as this, takes it,
by definition, outside of the ambit of the Commerce Clause.317
2. RLIUPA's Jurisdictional Element Does Not Sufficiently Narrow
Its Scope
The simple fact that RLUIPA has a jurisdictional element does not
guarantee its constitutionality. 38 The Lopez Court instructed lower
courts to inquire whether a law in question has a jurisdictional
element, and, if so, whether that jurisdictional element adequately
limits the scope of the law to situations arising under the Commerce
Clause.30 9 RLUIPA violates the Commerce Clause because its
jurisdictional element does not sufficiently narrow the scope of the
law to economic activities.310
The scope of RLUIPA reaches "any case in which ... the
substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several
States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability."3"' As written, this jurisdictional element
permits Congress to regulate local zoning decisions which have no
impact on other states or even on intrastate commerce.312 For
example, under the Act, churches can invoke RLUIPA to ignore fire
codes that mandate that the church not have more than a certain
number of people inside the building at one time. Fire codes
305. See generally Westchester Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 230; Freedom Baptist
Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857.
306. See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text (presenting the argument for
RLUIPA regulating economic activity).
307. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (establishing that if a
statute regulates non-economic activity, it does not fall within the ambit of Congress's
Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
308. See supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text (establishing that Lopez and
Morrison require a lower court to inquire into the adequacy of a jurisdictional
element).
309. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124-
26 (9th Cir. 2003).
310. See supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text (showing that RLUIPA's
jurisdictional element is insufficient).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(b) (2000).
312. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA's
jurisdictional element is too broad).
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regulating occupancy have, at best, a tenuous link to interstate
commerce. Primarily-if not totally-local governments enact them
to protect the public safety. Congress could have drafted RLUIPA
more narrowly to avoid any constitutional challenges, such as by
limiting the scope of the law only to the construction of new religious
facilities.313 The overbreadth of the jurisdictional element drafted
takes RLUIPA beyond the scope of activity the Commerce Clause
covers.
3. The Congressional Findings Are Inadequate
Although the Supreme Court does not require Congress to make
empirical findings, the Court will look to congressional findings for
effects on interstate commerce if the constitutionality of a law is
ambiguous. 314 Because RLUIPA fails to pass constitutional muster on
any other Commerce Clause grounds, the Court would need to look
to congressional findings.315 However, the paucity of such findings in
this case means that they cannot save RLUIPA from being found
unconstitutional. 316
In no case has the Supreme Court allowed the presence of extensive
congressional findings to overcome a finding that a statute did not
satisfy any of the other categories to render it constitutional.
Although there are congressional findings of RLUIPA's effect on
interstate commerce, these findings will not suffice to render
RLUIPA constitutional. 17 Congress heard extensive testimony on the
prejudice religious groups face, but only a few examples of how the
Act would actually regulate economic activity.318
Even if supporters of RLUIPA are correct in characterizing the
313. Walsh, supra note 15, at 210-11.
314. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (outlining when the Court will
look to congressional findings).
315. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
316. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("[T]he existence of
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of
Commerce Clause legislation."). For a description of the findings, see supra notes
160, 221.
317. See supra notes 213-22 and accompanying text (establishing the inadequacy of
the congressional findings for RLUIPA).
318. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of
Marc D. Stern). The Senate noted that according to Marc D. Stem's testimony:
[I]n each case, the burden on religious exercise, or removal of that burden,
will affect interstate commerce. This will most commonly be proved by
showing that the burden prevents a specific economic transaction in
commerce, such as a construction project, purchase or rental of a building, or
an interstate shipment of religious goods.
Id. at S7775. For an argument that these findings are not an example of extensive
legislative findings, see supra note 221 (comparing the legislative findings for
RLUIPA with the congressional findings for VAWA, and showing that RLUIPA's
legislative findings are not extensive).
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legislative findings as "extensive," '319 such findings would not guarantee
a finding of constitutionality. The Morrison Court found that
Congress had heard extensive testimony of VAWA's link to economic
activity before passing the Act.32 ' However, that evidence was not
enough to alter the Court's finding that VAWA violated the
Commerce Clause.32' Congress heard far less testimony before
passing RLUIPA than it did before passing VAWA. Thus, it follows
that the legislative findings accompanying RLUIPA will be
ineffective. In the absence of overwhelming empirical evidence, the
Court does not defer to Congress's determinations that a law falls
within Congress's Commerce Clause power.322 Thus, the findings
accompanying RLUIPA cannot overcome the fact that RLUIPA does
not regulate only economic activity, 323 and has an insufficient
jurisdictional element.32 4 The congressional findings cannot alter the
holding that RLUIPA is not constitutional under the Commerce
Clause.
4. RLUIPA Violates Principles of Federalism
The Commerce Clause ensures that Congress cannot regulate
activities that belong to the states.325 In enacting RLUIPA, Congress
encroached upon territory that states had traditionally regulated-
their local zoning laws. Jack McKeown, the zoning officer of
Middletown Township and defendant in Freedom Baptist Church v.
Middletown Township,326 explained the problem in his own words:
"One way to understand it... is that, traditionally, religious. .. uses
were neighborhood oriented, so most zoning made provisions for
religious.., uses within residential neighborhoods., 32 7  Congress
violates principles of federalism in attempting to regulate activities
319. Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 144, at 992.
320. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
321. Id. The Court did not allow the existence of findings to alter its conclusion
because "[w]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial rather than a legislative question." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring))).
322. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 ("Simply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make
it so." (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring))).
323. See supra notes 303-07 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA
regulates non-economic activity).
324. See supra notes 308-13 and accompanying text (establishing that RLUIPA's
jurisdictional element is insufficient).
325. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) (establishing that
the Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the power to regulate activity
occurring within a single state unless the activity affects interstate commerce).
326. 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
327. Liptak, supra note 135, at A10.
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that local zoning boards traditionally regulate. As such, RLUIPA is
an example of Congress usurping state power.
Furthermore, local governments have difficulty defeating RLUIPA
challenges. RLUIPA places a strenuous burden on local governments
because the statute requires strict scrutiny analysis.3 28  Local
governments must show a compelling interest and that the action
taken was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
Moreover, the effects of finding that small towns violated RLUIPA
can be devastating to them, because the litigation and possible
damage awards can be large.329 As a result, RLUIPA takes localities'
right to control their own zoning laws away from them.
Moreover, a finding that the Commerce Clause cannot support
RLUIPA may clarify the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The decision would show lower courts that civil laws may also fail to
fall within the ambit of the Commerce Clause. That message would
also register with Congress, which could be more careful in drafting
future legislation under its Commerce Clause power. Finally, such a
finding would also alert Congress that they cannot overturn Court
decisions with legislation.
Finally, RLUIPA allows religious groups to bypass many laws that
are in the public's best interest, such as historical landmark
protections and health and fire codes.33° Although Congress enacted
the land use portion of RLUIPA to overcome burdens on religious
groups,331 the Act actually provides too much protection. RLUIPA
gives unequal protection to religious groups in the face of zoning
regulations that affect all landowners. Hence, RLUIPA also violates
notions of equal protection.32 Because RLUIPA violates notions of
Equal Protection and federalism, and because it fails under all four
Lopez factors, RLUIPA must fall.
328. Ross K. Baker, supra note 227, at B7. But see Giaimo & Merriam, supra note
62. Giaimo and Merriam propose strategies for local zoning offices to overcome a
RLUIPA challenge. Id. at 16. Among the strategies suggested are proving that the
restriction furthers a "compelling governmental interest" by providing strong
evidence, forcing the plaintiff to show that the regulation in question presents a
substantial burden on them, amending the zoning process to "grant administrative
relief to applicants who demonstrate a RLUIPA right," and engaging in
communication with the offending party to try to resolve the issue before someone
files suit. Id. at 16-17; see also Hook, supra note 14. Hook suggests other tactics for
local governments defending against RLUIPA challenges. Hook also provides
strategies for religious groups to obtain victories in RLUIPA cases. Id. at 855-58.
329. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (establishing that courts have held
cities financially liable for RLUIPA violations).
330. See supra notes 71-74 (showing that religious groups can invoke RLUIPA to
ignore historical landmark protections, as well as health and fire codes).
331. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sens. Hatch &
Kennedy).
332. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
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CONCLUSION
Congress's most recent attempt to protect religious groups from
governmental burdens exceeded its constitutional authority.
RLUIPA does not regulate only economic activity and does not
contain a satisfactory jurisdictional element. Moreover, RLUIPA has
an attenuated link to interstate commerce and lacks adequate
legislative findings to support its constitutionality. Finally, RLUIPA
violates notions of federalism and the Equal Protection Clause.
Federal appellate courts hearing challenges to RLUIPA's
constitutionality must find that the Act does not fall within the ambit
of Congress's Commerce Clause power. And Congress must go back
to the drawing board if it wishes to enact a religious freedom statute
that respects state and local governments and the United States
Constitution.
Notes & Observations
